This research investigates the parliamentary oversight and accountability challenges facing the Kurdistan Region of Iraq from 2005 to 2025, focusing on the critical constitutional void within which the Kurdistan Parliament operates. Despite functioning under a parliamentary system established by Election Act No. 1 of 2005 and recognized as the sole federal region under the 2005 Iraqi Constitution—which explicitly grants regional powers the right to adopt their own constitution—the Kurdistan Region has failed to produce a permanent regional constitution for more than three decades. Employing a mixed-methods approach that combines qualitative analysis of legal frameworks with quantitative data on parliamentary oversight mechanisms, this study tests the hypothesis that the absence of a regional constitution has facilitated the entrenchment of a partocracy and family-based governance model, thereby crippling parliamentary representation and undermining oversight efficiency. The research examines key accountability tools including questioning, interpellations, and ministerial oversight, drawing on empirical data from parliamentary sessions between 2005 and 2025, supplemented by interviews with constitutional experts and political analysts. Findings reveal that the constitutional vacuum has enabled the personalization and politicization of parliamentary mechanisms, particularly questioning procedures, which lack legal enforceability. Statistical evidence demonstrates that unanswered parliamentary questions remain pervasive, budget laws have gone unsubmitted for approval during multiple cabinet terms, and executive dominance has systematically weakened legislative checks on government power. The study concludes that the absence of a formal regional constitution—combined with power concentration within two dominant political families (the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)—has created structural barriers to effective accountability. Without a constitutional framework to regulate the separation of powers, protect parliamentary independence, and establish enforceable oversight mechanisms, the Kurdistan Parliament remains institutionally incapacitated, unable to fulfill its representative and supervisory functions as a guarantor of rights and freedoms. Keywords: Constitutional Void, Parliamentary Oversight, Accountability, Kurdistan Parliament, Partocracy, separation of powers.
